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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE "DISABILITY
OFFSET PROVISION"
The Social Security Act was enacted on August 14, 1935.1 The purpose of
the Act, as stated in its preamble, was "to provide for the general welfare by
establishing a system of federal old-age benefits."'2 Not until twenty-one years
later, in 1956, did Congress amend the law to provide for the payment of
social security disability benefits.3
Before 1956, cash payments were made only upon death or retirement.
Arguments were raised supporting and opposing the extension of benefits.
Those favoring disability benefits suggested that the old-age and survivors'
benefits, to a considerable extent, rested on a general presumption of the likeli-
hood of serious disabilities in later life. They pointed out that no magic was
involved in the selection of age 65 as the point at which workers, no longer
young, are forced out of the labor market because of disabilities. Statistics
indicated that around a million persons between ages 50 and 65 would be
working but for serious long-term disability.4
Retirement protection was woefully incomplete because it did not provide
a lower retirement age for those who were demonstrably retired by reason of a
permanent and total disability. The recommendation was made to narrow that
serious gap in the retirement protection system by providing for payment of
benefits at age 50 to those workers who were forced into premature retirement
because of disability.
Those opposing the concept of disability benefits felt that conditions for
payment would be difficult to determine, that the conditions of payment had a
completely different nature as compared with the present provisions for old-
age and survivors' benefits, and that they lacked objectivity in the determination
of such disability, which would create administrative difficulties. The opponents
thought that, in many instances, physical disability would not necessarily pro-
duce economic disability, although this problem would arise if monthly benefits
were available.5
A compromise was reached on these matters and Public Law 84-880
provided, in part, for adding two new sections to the Social Security Act,
Sections 2236 and 2247 relating to disability insurance benefit payments and the
reduction of benefits based on disability, respectively. Under Section 223, pay-
ment of benefits was provided to persons who became permanently and totally
1 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1935).
2 Id.
3 42 U.S.C. § 424 (1956).
4 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3941.
5 Id. at 3879.
6 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1956).
7 42 U.S.C. § 424 (1956).
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disabled and had attained the age of 50 but not the age of 65. However, under
Section 224, if any such individual was entitled to disability insurance benefits
and a periodic benefit was payable for that month to that individual under a
workmen's compensation law or certain other plans on account of a physical or
mental impairment, the social security disability benefit would be reduced by
an amount equal to the periodic benefit or benefits for that month. Therefore,
the social security disability benefit was offset by an amount equal to a payment
under a workmen's compensation law. This provision eventually became known
as the "disability offset provision."
In 1958, Congress passed legislation which repealed Section 224 of the
Social Security Act.8 Senate Report No. 23889 which accompanied H.R. 13549
characterized the disability offset provision as having produced inequitable
effects. The Senate Committee on Finance characterized the Social Security
Amendments of 195610 as a conservative extension in order to reduce to a
minimum the problems that were inevitable in a new program (providing
monthly benefits for injured workers who were no longer able to work because
of total disability). Because of the favorable experience that developed, further
protection against the risk of total disability was sought in addition to removing
the disability offset provision. Benefits were made available for dependents of
disability insurance beneficiaries.11
The Senate Committee on Finance suggested that the disability benefit off-
set provision was included in the law at the time that the provisions for social
security disability benefits were enacted to prevent duplication between the new
benefits and other disability payments, pending the development of adminis-
trative experience. After two years' experience, the danger of duplication was
not found to be of sufficient importance to justify reduction of the social security
disability benefits. 12
The Committee believed that social security disability benefits should be
viewed as providing the basic protection against loss of income due to disabling
illness and concluded that the purposes of the program were incompatible with
a reduction of the benefits because disability benefits are payable under other
programs. 1
3
The Social Security Amendments of 1960 further liberalized the disability
insurance benefits by making three important changes. Under Section 223 (a)
(B) of the Social Security Act1 4 the age limit of 50 was removed and disabled
insured workers under age 50 and their dependents could qualify for benefits.
8 Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Title II, § 206, 72 Stat. 1025.
9 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4221.
10 Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Title II, § 206, 72 Stat. 1025.
13 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4221.
12 Id. at 4228.
13 Id. at 4221.
14 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1) (B) (1960).
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In Senate Report No. 185615 which accompanied H.R. 12580 the Senate
Committee on Finance felt that although the age restriction was appropriate as
part of the conservative approach when disability insurance benefits were first
provided, 16 with sufficient experience and an actuarial surplus in the disability
insurance trust fund, liberalization was in order. The need of younger disabled
workers and their families for disability protection was in some respects greater
than that of older workers.
Section 222 of the Social Security Act 7 was substantially revised by
strengthening the rehabilitation aspects of the disability program by providing
a twelve-month period of trial work, during which benefits are continued for
all disabled workers who attempt to return to work. The trial-work period was
broadened to include a wide spectrum of work situations in which benefits would
be continued. The Senate Committee on Finance believed that the broadening
of the trial-work period would be an incentive to greater rehabilitation effort.18
Section 223 (a) (1) of the Social Security Act19 was also amended. The
waiting period for disability insurance benefits was eliminated in certain cases.
When disability insurance benefits were first provided,20 a disabled worker
could not receive disability benefits until after his disability continued through
a waiting period of six months. The Senate Committee on Finance felt that
where disability recurs relatively soon after the termination of a prior period
of disability, the worker should not be required to undergo another waiting
period before benefits could be paid. This waiting period would encourage
disabled persons to return to work even though their work attempts might be
unsuccessful. 21
The new amendment, Section 233 (a) (1), provided that those who became
disabled within five years after termination of a period of disability would not
be required to serve another six-month waiting period before they would again
be eligible to receive disability insurance benefits. The Committees intended
to restrict the group aided to those with a second disability which was rea-
sonably related to the first.22
Changes provided in the Social Security Amendments of 1965 were even
more sweeping. However, a disability offset provision reappeared. Section 335
of Public Law 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, enacted Section 224 of the Social Security
Act,28 which relates to the reduction of benefits in the event of receipt of
workmen's compensation.
15 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3608.
16 42 U.S.C. § 424 (1956).
17 42 U.S.C. § 422(c) (1960).
Is 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3623.
19 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1) (1960).
20 42 U.S.C. § 424 (1956).
21 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3624.
22 Id.
23 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1965).
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In Senate Report No. 40424 which accompanied H.R. 6675, the Senate
Committee on Finance noted the concern that had been expressed by many wit-
nesses in the hearings about the payment of disability benefits concurrently
with benefits payable under state workmen's compensation programs. The Com-
mittee believed that, as a matter of sound principle, preventing the payment of
excessive combined benefits was desirable. 25
Except where a state workmen's compensation law provided for an offset
against social security disability benefits, the new offset provision provides for
a reduction in the social security benefits in the event the total benefits paid
under the two programs exceed eighty per cent of the worker's monthly earnings
prior to the disability. In no event, however, would the total benefits payable
with respect to a worker be reduced below the amount of the unreduced monthly
social security benefits.
The Committee believed that the new provision avoided the problems and
inequities of the earlier offset provision because the previous reduction formula
required reductions that frequently resulted in benefits that replaced no more
than thirty per cent or so of the worker's earnings at disablement. 26 The new
provision also overcame, in part, the erosion in the earnings replacement value
of disability benefits which occurs over a period of time with increases in wage
levels and living costs. The reduction itself would be automatically redetermined
through a triennial redetermination of the eighty per cent limitation to allow
for increases in the level of earnings despite the eighty per cent limitation.27 In
addition, whenever a general benefit increase would be legislated for all social
security beneficiaries, those increases would be passed on to the beneficiary
despite the eighty per cent limitation.
Among the other changes in 1965, section 303 of Public Law 89-97, 79
Stat. 286, amended two sections of the Social Security Act. It eliminated the
"long-continued and indefinite duration requirement" from the definition of
disability under Section 216(i) (1) of the Social Security Act,28 which sub-
stantially revised the term "disability" under Section 223(c) (2) of the Social
Security Act.29
Before enactment of this change, disability insurance benefits were payable
only if the worker's disability was expected to result in death or be of long-
continued and indefinite duration. The change broadened the disability protec-
tion afforded by the Social Security program by providing disability insurance
benefits for an insured worker who had been totally disabled throughout a
continuous period of six calendar months.
24 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943.
25 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2040.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1) (1965).
29 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2) (1965).
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The Committee felt that this change could result in the payment of disability
benefits in cases of short-term, temporary disability; cases in which most state
workmen's compensation laws would be providing temporary total disability
benefits. The Committee also felt that many of the cases would be of temporary
disability resulting from accidents or illnesses requiring a limited period of
immobility. Therefore, the Committee recommended providing payment of
disability benefits for an insured worker who had been or could be expected
to be totally disabled throughout a continuous period of twelve calendar
months.3 °
Although disability benefits would be provided for a totally disabled worker
even though his condition may be expected to improve after a year, experience
under the disability program had demonstrated, in the great majority of cases
in which total disability continues for at least a year, that the disability is es-
sentially permanent.3 1
The Social Security Amendments of 1967 again modified the disability
benefit offset provision as it related to workmen's compensation benefits. Before
the 1967 changes, a worker's average current earnings, used to arrive at the eighty
per cent offset level, did not include that part of the earnings in excess of the
maximum annual amount that is creditable for Social Security purposes.
The objective of the disability benefit offset provision was to avoid pay-
ment of combined amounts of Social Security benefits and workmen's compensa-
tion payments that would be excessive in comparison with the beneficiary's earn-
ings before disablement. The Committee believed that those provisions went
beyond that objective in cases where a worker's actual previous earnings in
employment covered by the act was higher than the maximum amount that is
creditable under the Social Security program. 3 2 For example, a disabled worker,
whose actual earnings during his highest five-year period in work covered
by the act are double the amount counted for Social Security purposes, may be
restricted to combined benefits of forty per cent, instead of eighty per cent,
of his previous pay.33
Section 108 of Public Law 90-248, 81 Stat. 821, relating to the increase of
earnings counted for benefit and tax purposes, amended a number of sections
which in part provided for workers who earn more than the annual amount
that may be counted for Social Security purposes to have those amounts
counted for benefits purposes.
Not until Gambill v. Finch34 was the constitutionality of the disability off-
set provision questioned. The plaintiff alleged that the reduction of disability
30 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2039.
31 Id.
32 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884.
33 Id.
34 309 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
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benefits under the Social Security Act by receipt of workmen's compensation
benefits was arbitrary and denied due process of law. The plaintiff had incurred
an injury in 1963 which entitled him to workmen's compensation under Michigan
law and to disability benefits under the Social Security law.3 5 The plaintiff
negotiated a lump-sum workmen's compensation settlement in 1965 when no
statute required a reduction of disability benefits because of workmen's com-
pensation. The first disability offset provision had already been repealed .3
The plaintiff applied and was awarded Social Security disability insurance
benefits; but before any payment was made, the award was reduced by ap-
plication of the statutory formula.3 7 The reduction was applied for the number
of weeks covered in the workmen's compensation settlement.
The question the case raised was whether any vested interest in Social
Security disability benefits accrues to the wage-earner who supported the legisla-
tion by tax payments. 38 The Supreme Court had indicated that legislation of a
similar nature did not deprive one of any property right.39 It had already stated
in Flemming v. Nestor4" that "of special importance in this case is the fact that
eligibility for benefits, and the amount of benefits do not in any true sense
depend on contribution to the program through the payment of taxes, but rather
on the earnings record of the primary beneficiary."'4 1 The Court noted the
"highly complex and interrelated statutory structure" and stated: "to engraft
upon the social security system a concept of 'accrued property rights' would
deprive it of the flexibiliy and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing condi-
tions which it demands. 42
Justice Taylor concluded in Gambill that:
While the Due Process Clause would protect plaintiff from an arbitrary
exercise of congressional power, the Court is unable to conclude that
the statute is arbitrary. In this complex area fears that duplication of
benefits under the two programs would have hindered the deveopment
of workmen's compensation programs would be adequate reason
for the change. 43
A few months later, another constitutional attack was leveled against
Section 224 of the Social Security Act 44 in the case of Bartley v. Finch.45
The claimant alleged that Section 224 of the Social Security Act46 was in con-
35 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1956).
86 Act of Aug. 28, 1968, Title II, § 206, 72 Stat. 1025.
37 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1965).
38 309 F. Supp. at 2.
39 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 611.
42 Id.
43 309 F. Supp. at 2.
44 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1965).
45 311 F. Supp. 876 (D. Ky. 1970).
46 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1965).
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flict with the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in provid-
ing for a reduction in disability benefits when the beneficiary also receives
workmen's compensation benefits, and in not providing for a similar reduction
for other persons receiving Social Security disability benefits who also receive
private insurance benefits or other benefits. The court noted that:
In enacting the Social Security Act, Congress was under no obliga-
tion to exhaust all possible sources of income which beneficiaries of
the federal Social Security legislation might receive in addition to
their benefits whether from a private health and accident insurance
policy or from any other arrangement .. .social security benefits are
paid to replace lost earnings and not in the nature of compensation
which with other compensations have been found to result in a bene-
ficiary receiving for disability more than he was earning before he
became disabled. 47
The court held that, "Section 224, 42 U.S.C. Section 424a, does not contravene
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. This amend-
ment does not contain an 'equal protection clause.' "48
In early 1971, the case of Lofty v. Richardson49 was decided. The plaintiff
had been granted total and permanent disability benefits under the Social
Security Act starting in 1966. In June 1966 he accepted a lump-sum settle-
ment in full payment of his workmen's compensation claim arising out of the
same injuries which produced his total and permanent disability for Social
Security benefits.
Taking into account the workmen's compensation settlement, the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare reduced the plaintiff-appellant's Social
Security disability benefits from $269.80 a month to $25.80 a month for forty-
four months, or until the workmen's compensation settlement had been exhausted
at the then-current state workmen's compensation law rate for the State of
Michigan of $57 per week.
The action of reduction was taken under 42 U.S.C. 424a, as amended,
which placed a limit of eighty per cent of the claimant's previous average
monthly earnings upon the total of Social Security and workmen's compensation
benefits he was to receive. The plaintiff claimed that this section of the Social
Security Act violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution in
that when Congress made workmen's compensation the only subject for its
deductions, it created a patently arbitrary classification. 50
The court first proceeded to review the rules pertaining to legislative power.
The court emphasized the distinction between congressional power and wisdom
by quoting at length from Flemming v. Nestor:51
47 311 F. Supp. at 879.
48 Id. at 880.
49 440 F. 2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1971).
5O Id. at 1145.
51 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
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Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual
benefit under a social welfare program such as this, we must recognize
that the due process clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if
the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking
in rational justification.5 2
The court then illustrated the breadth of legislative power accorded to
Congress, or the states, by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitu-
tional limitations contained in the due process and equal protection clauses. It
was indicated that some basic guidelines had already been firmly fixed:
The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative
of the equal protection clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated
to the pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted
constitutionally . . . their statutory classifications will be set aside
only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.53
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.
The court also quoted from Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Company,54
which dealt with a somewhat similar classification argument:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate
the equal protection clause merely because the classifications made by
its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,'
it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification
'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results
in some inequality.'55
The court then reviewed, at length, the legislative history of the Social
Security Act and determined that it could not say that "the classification herein
attacked was utterly lacking in rational justification."5 6 First, the court felt that
such determination "would represent a very narrow construction of the con-
gressional power to enact, amend and modify social legislation as required by
the circumstances reported to Congress concerning its operation. '57 Second,
enforcement of the workmen's compensation deductions would be relatively
simple, whereas separating the wage benefits from civil damage judgments
or determining who had received private insurance benefits, might present
administrative problems of a serious nature.58 Finally,
both Social Security and workmen's compensation programs are
social welfare legislation and more arguably duplicative of one another
52 440 F.2d at 1145.
53 Id. at 1146.
54 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
55 440 F.2d at 1147.
56 Id. at 1146.
57 Id. at 1151.
58 Id.
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than could appropriately be claimed concerning Social Security bene-
fits and the other two types of payments; private accident or disability
insurance which is frequently paid for entirely by the recipient.59
In November 1971, the Supreme Court rendered its decision concerning
the constitutionality of Section 224 of the Social Security Act,60 in the case of
Richardson v. Belcher."1 Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion of the
Court in the 4 to 3 decision upholding the constitutionality of the statutory
provision. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun joined, while
Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion as did Justice Marshall, who was
joined by Justice Brennan.
Factually, the beneficiary was granted Social Security disability benefits
effective in October 1968 which were subsequently reduced upon a finding that
he was receiving workmen's compensation benefits from the State of West
Virginia.
Upon exhaustion of the beneficiary's administrative remedies, an action
was brought challenging the reduction of payments on the grounds that the
statutory provision deprived him of the due process of law guaranteed by the
fifth amendment. The district court held the statute unconstitutional,6 2 and the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare appealed directly to the Supreme
Court which held that:
The fact that Social Security benefits are financed in part by taxes on
an employee's wages does not in itself limit the power of Congress to
fix the levels of benefits under the Act or the conditions upon which
they may be paid. Nor does an expectation interest in public benefits
confer a contractual right to receive the expected amounts.63
The plaintiff relied, in part, upon an analogy drawn in Goldberg v. Kelley,64
between social welfare and property. The Court felt that the analogy could not
be "stretched to impose a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to
make substantive changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits. '65 The
Court cautioned, however, that to characterize an act of Congress as conferring
a public benefit does not, of course, immunize it from scrutiny under the fifth
amendment. In answer to plaintiff's argument that the statutory provision
discriminates between those disabled employees who receive workmen's com-
pensation and those who receive compensation from private insurance or tort
claim awards, the Court stated that, "a statutory classification in the area of
social welfare is consistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
59 Id. at 1151-52.
60 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1965).
61 401 U.S. 935 (1971).
62 Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1970).
63 Richardson v. Belcher, 401 U.S. at 939.
64 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
65 401 U.S. at 940.
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Amendment if it is rationally based and free from invidious discrimination. '"6
This test was laid down in Dandridge v. Williams.67
The Court noted that to find a rational basis for the classification created
by Section 224 of the Social Security Act 6s it needed to go no further than the
reasoning of Congress as reflected in the legislative history.
Congress could rationally conclude that this need [disability
benefits] should continue to be met primarily by the states, and that a
federal program which began to duplicate the efforts of the states
might lead to the gradual weakening or atrophy of the state programs
. . . if the goals sought are legitimate, and the classification adopted
is rationally related to the achievement of those goals, then the action
of Congress is not so arbitrary as to violate the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment.69
Almost as important as what the Court did say was what it did not say.
It apparently, for the time being, adopted the thrust of the arguments of the
proponents of the disability offset provision.
The initial function and objective of the Social Security law was not aimed
at replacing wages lost as a result of temporary disability. However, the re-
placement of wages on a temporary basis has been one of the major goals of
the state workmen's compensation system. In addition to providing benefits for
those temporarily disabled, the function of the state system is to provide,
through cost incentives, well-managed safety programs and intensive medical
and vocational rehabilitation for those who sustain occupational injuries or
diseases.
Accident prevention is based on the rating principle that the costs of
industrial injuries should be borne by the employer. The lower the accident
rate, the lower the workmen's compensation premium. The same is true regard-
ing rehabilitation, which is the control of disability through maximum restora-
tion of a disabled person.
The effects of overlapping systems would destroy the incentive behind
accident prevention. If workmen's compensation costs were absorbed into the
Social Security program, employers without safety programs and those whose
employment is hazardous would pay no more than those employers who have
adopted safety programs or who have less hazardous employment.70 Also, little
incentive would exist for a disabled person to accept the risk, pain, and struggle
involved in attempting to become self-supporting again through the process of
vocational rehabilitation.
66 Id. at 941.
67 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
68 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1965).
69 401 U.S. at 942.
70 Hearings on H.R. 6675 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 89th Congress,
1st Sess., p. 259 (1965).
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The concept behind the Richardson decision is likely to be reexamined
again shortly. Only a matter of time remains before Congress enacts some type
of national health insurance program. Medical care is presently being provided
for a large segment of the population. Congress' solution to the problem that, in
most states, the workmen's compensation laws do provide for unlimited medical
benefits for those sustaining occupational injuries and diseases will be interest-
ing. Will another offset provision be enacted? If so, will its constitutionality be
sustained?
PETER V. SOLBER
